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The Swinging Pendulum of Sentencing Reform:
Political Actors Regulating District Court Discretion
Lydia Brashear Tiede
ABSTRACT
In this article, application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and
changes to the law, limiting and expanding judicial discretion under the
Guidelines are analyzed from 1999 to 2006 for a sample of drug
trafficking cases. Despite a large number of studies on the impact of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and their reform, this is the only recent study
that specifically controls for case fact variation so that the effect of the
law and reforms can be properly tested. Most previous studies of the
Guidelines to date do not adequately consider how the facts of the cases
may drive the decisions that judges are making. This study substantially
advances our understanding of the Guidelines by analyzing cases with
similar case facts. The method employed allows for a specific analysis of
how the Guideline system both allows for and prevents political actors
from controlling disparity in sentencing. The results show that when
district court judges use sentencing tables required by the Sentencing
Guidelines they overwhelmingly focus their decisions at the very
minimum of those ranges, suggesting judicial preferences that are at
odds with those of Congress. Further, disparity in sentencing persists
among the circuits despite laws that constrain judicial discretion, such
as the PROTECT Act of 2003, and laws or cases that broaden discretion,
such as the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Booker. Although disparity is often viewed by politicians and judicial
scholars negatively, I argue, based on my quantitative analysis as well as
judges’ opinions collected from an original nationwide survey and live
interviews, that such disparity correctly reflects local realities faced by
district court judges in various regions across the country.

* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Houston. This project was
supported by award #2007-IJ-CX-0015 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, United States Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Department of Justice. I would like to thank federal district court judges across the
country who responded to the district court survey and/or agreed to an interview to increase my
understanding of sentencing reform. Without their willingness to take the time to answer my
inquiries, this project would not have been possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing law reform is a manifestation of the constant battle
waged between politicians who want to appear tough on crime and
judges who want to act independently to apply their expertise and
judgment in adjudicating criminal cases. Politicians worldwide are
concerned about what voters think, and this electoral connection1 makes
them especially interested in the public’s opinion on issues concerning
law, order, and security. As a result, legislators enact and amend criminal
and sentencing laws at a constant pace in the hope of constraining judges
deemed to be too soft on crime and a judicial branch deemed to be too
independent. Sometimes, higher courts assert themselves in the reform
process by ruling legislation unconstitutional or directing lower courts
regarding interpretation of the law.
Continuous reform and reaction to reforms are manifested
throughout the federal and individual state sentencing systems, and
sentencing reforms that are politically in favor at one time often are
deemed out of favor at a later time. For example, in the last two decades
stiff sentencing penalties aimed at limiting judicial discretion and
providing tough penalties, especially to offenders involved in drug
crimes, have predominated the criminal justice agenda. However,
recently the U.S. Supreme Court found the federal Guidelines and many
state sentencing systems unconstitutional. 2 The Court’s decisions have
coincided with economic challenges associated with maintaining a
burgeoning prison system. 3 Now state and federal legislators are
considering less rigid penalties for some offenses to reduce prison
overcrowding and the concurrent impact on state and federal budgets.
The Federal Sentencing Guideline system provides a further example
1. DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing
that Congressmen single-mindedly seek to be re-elected). As a result, politicians often advocate
certain policies and legislative action in hopes of pleasing their constituency, such that they are reelected. For Mayhew, congressmen are not necessarily concerned with enacting good policy, but
rather with enacting policy that will improve their re-election chances. Id. at 16. To be re-elected,
congressmen engage in three specific activities: “advertising, credit claiming and position taking.”
Id. at 73. When congressmen advocate and vote on legislation supporting or opposing a certain
position they engage in all three of these activities.
2. In a series of cases leading up to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the U.S.
Supreme Court found sentencing schemes in the following states unconstitutional and required their
modification. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (finding the California
determinate sentencing law unconstitutional); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (finding
the Washington state system violated the Sixth Amendment); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)
(holding that the court must find that an aggravating factor under state law exists beyond a
reasonable doubt in order for the defendant to be sentenced to death); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000) (finding the New Jersey system flawed).
3. Sean Hayes, The End of Determinate Sentencing: How California’s Prison Problem Can
be Solved with Quick Fixes and a Long Term Commission, Working paper of the California
Sentencing and Corrections Policy Series, Stanford University Criminal Justice Center (2007).
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of the swinging pendulum of sentencing reform and is the focus of this
Article which tests the impact of the federal Guidelines and recent
reforms on case outcomes. The current federal sentencing system was
created in 1984 when Congress passed the U.S. Sentencing Reform Act. 4
One of the purposes of this Act was to rein in what were thought to be
recalcitrant district court judges whose sentencing decisions were largely
inconsistent with one another.5 The Act created the use of Sentencing
Guidelines requiring federal judges to choose sentences for specific
crimes from a pre-determined range of possibilities. The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines system, put in place by this Act, is thought to constrain
district court judges in sentencing more than any other system in the
United States or abroad. Although, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were
applied to all federal criminal cases, Congress further restrained judicial
discretion in 2003 only for the Supreme Court to completely emasculate
the Guideline system in the landmark case of United States v. Booker.6
This article analyzes the Federal Guideline system and reform to this
system in order to ascertain whether the intent behind the Guidelines and
their reform was achieved. 7 In this way, the article seeks to address the
following questions: Did the Guidelines achieve their intended purposes?
Did district court judges respond to legislative attacks on their discretion
implicit in the Guidelines and their 2003 reforms? Can legislators really
4. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. Although the Sentencing Reform Act was the first
comprehensive piece of legislation which tackled disparity in federal sentencing, President Lyndon
Johnson created a National Strategy on Crime in 1966 to deal with the problems related to the
federal criminal code and sentencing system. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, REPORT
TO C ONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING G UIDELINES IN
RESPONSE TO SECTION 401(M) OF PUBLIC LAW 108–21, B-2, at 3-5 (2003) [hereinafter USSC
Report, 2003]. This strategy resulted in the creation of the Brown Commission which was tasked
with revising the entire federal criminal code and reforming sentencing. Id.; see also, William W.
Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold
Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 365 (1991) (noting
the work of the Brown Commission). One recommendation of the Brown Commission with lasting
implications to the Sentencing Reform Act was the listing of authorized sentences for specific
federal crimes. REP. NO. 97-307, 1st Sess., at 6 (1981).
5. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 39 (1973)
(providing one of the first criticisms of sentencing disparity due to district court judges’ unbridled
discretion in sentencing). One cannot underestimate the criticism of Frankel, a federal judge and
scholar regarding the discretion afforded to judges in sentencing prior to the Guidelines. He stated,
“[t]he sentencing power of the judges are, in short, so far unconfined that, except for frequently
monstrous maximum limits, they are effectively subject to no law at all.” Id. at 8.
6. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
7. S. REP. N O. 98-225, 1st Sess. (1983) (providing the legislative history of the Sentencing
Reform Act); USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, B-1 to B-5 (providing a succinct description of the
legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the Sentencing Guidelines
as well as the United States Sentencing Commission); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal
Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 291 (1993); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Yoh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (providing a discussion of
the legislative history and political discussion relating to the Guidelines).
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control judicial discretion through sentencing guidelines, and if so,
should they? Finally, should some disparity in sentencing prevail to
allow for variations in regional culture? For example, certain regions,
such as those along the southwest border of the United States, must deal
with unique and heavy case loads related to criminal immigration
violations. As a result, these regions may appropriately employ disparate
sentencing practices from the rest of the regions in the United States with
fewer of these types of cases. The questions addressed above are
answered by a unique quantitative analysis of a small group of federal
drug trafficking cases which are matched by similarity of case facts and
defendants’ criminal history. The above questions also are analyzed
qualitatively by reference to survey and interview responses. The results
of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis show that disparity of
sentencing can be controlled by politicians to some extent, is not as
serious a harm as suggested by tough-on-crime politicians, and where
disparity persists it may be appropriate.
Specifically, this analysis will focus on whether the U. S. Sentencing
Guideline scheme, as originally conceived, effectively constrained
judges when sentencing defendants for federal drug crimes from 1999 to
2006.8 Although many studies have been written on the effect of the
Guidelines, no recent studies have employed a method controlling for
case facts so that the effect of the Guidelines and changes to the
Guideline scheme can be tested directly. This analysis not only compares
judges’ sentencing decisions when they apply Guideline ranges in
sentencing tables and depart from these ranges, but also focuses on how
the most significant and recent changes in the Guideline scheme
mandated by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Booker affected case outcomes, departure rates, and disparity of
decisions. This analysis is supplemented with information from
interviews and surveys of individual district court judges across the
United States to provide insights into how district court judges perceive
and react to constraints on their discretion.
In Part II of this article, I review how politicians and higher courts
control lower court judges by attempting to curtail their discretion. As
seen from this review, most of the scholarly literature refers to
intermediate appellate courts rather than trial courts as “lower courts.”
As a result, this study’s focus on district court decision-making adds to a
more general understanding of the thought processes of judges at the trial
8. Data for this study was derived from the Inter-University Consortium of Political and
Social Research (“ICPSR”), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. The ICPSR data used for this analysis are
entitled “Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences” ICPSR study numbers 3106 (1999), 3496
(2000), 3497 (2001), 4110 (2002), 4290 (2003), 4633 (2004), 4630 (2005), and 20120 (2006). Data
files generated for this study on two federal drug crimes are available upon request of the author.
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court level. In Part III, I provide a description of the Guidelines and how
they can be used to answer the questions related to discretion and
disparity addressed in this paper. In part IV, I examine recent changes to
the Guideline scheme, including the PROTECT Act and U.S. v. Booker.
In parts V and VI respectively, I test hypotheses, provide results, and
comment on their implications regarding the effectiveness of the
Guidelines and their reforms. In part VII, I argue that policy makers
should not view sentencing disparity due to judicial discretion and
regional variations negatively. First, disparity of sentencing may be
completely appropriate where judges face different caseloads and types.
Second, in order for sentencing to remain individualistic rather than a
mechanical application of the law to the facts, some disparity should be
expected.
II. CONTROLLING THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Rational choice and strategic interaction theories are largely used to
explain how political institutions control the courts.9 These theories
analyze how judges or politicians make strategic decisions based on how
they believe other political actors will respond. Generally, the focus of
these models is exclusively on how political institutions control either the
Supreme Court or the judiciary as a whole. 10 Some, however, focus on
how legislators and higher courts control lower appellate courts. In this
regard, scholars ask two general questions relating to whether legislators
or higher courts can control lower courts’ decision-making processes.
First, in the judicial decision-making literature, scholars inquire
whether legislation effectively controls lower courts. Mathew
McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast 11 show that legislatures use
structure and process as a means of controlling these courts. These
scholars suggest that politicians expand the federal judiciary in order to
force the Supreme Court to alter doctrine in a way preferred by political
officials. 12 John DeFigueirido and Emerson Tiller also find that Congress
9. LEE EPSTEIN & STEPHEN KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997) (suggesting that
Supreme Court justices make decisions based on their own self- interest as well as their beliefs about
how other political actors will act).
10. John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 1 (1990); Rafael Gely & Pablo Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON & ORG.
263 (1991).
11. McCubbins et al., Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995) [hereinafter McCubbins, Politics]; see also McCubbins
et al., Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105 (2006) (extending
prior studies to show the conditions under which politicians may change the size of the judiciary in
order to control it).
12. McCubbins, Politics, supra note 11.
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controls the federal judiciary by its “ability to balance or stack the courts
through the creation of federal judgeships.” 13
Politicians also determine how judges make decisions on certain
matters by including language in statutes that explicitly includes the
standards for review that judges must employ when deciding cases and
by stating what types of decisions they may review. 14 Huber and Shipan
argue that the length of statutes affects judicial discretion. Short statutes
provide judges with fewer instructions regarding their decision-making
and thus allow judges to use their own individual discretion. 15
Alternatively, longer statutes provide more detailed instructions about
how judges should act and thus curtail discretion. 16 Some scholars
strongly oppose the view that law and process exclusively affect
decision-making and instead espouse the attitudinal model, which posits
that judges make decisions based on their policy or political preferences
rather than strict adherence to the law. 17 In the sentencing arena,
Schanzenbach and Tiller 18 and Cross and Tiller 19 show that the
compliance of lower courts is a function of the political composition and
political proclivities of lower court judges via the court of appeals.
Second, judicial scholars ask whether higher court precedent

13. John DeFigueriredo & Emerson Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 435
(1996) (noting that Congress is more inclined to expand the judiciary when the nominating president
and confirming Senate are politically aligned).
14. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444–45 (1989) (“[O]ne
potential means of protecting against judicial readjustment of policy is to use either explicit
legislation or administrative procedures in an attempt to constrain judicial decisions.”).
15. JOHN HUBER & CHARLES SHIPAN, DELIBERATE D ISCRETION?: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 44–77, 176–83 (2002).
16. Id. Huber and Shipan argue that the number of words present in a statute define how
much discretion judges have. Id. at 44. For example, statutes with many words are supposed to put
more constraints on judges’ discretion and statutes with fewer words are supposed to contain fewer
constraints. Id. at 44–45. While Huber and Shipan correctly assert that the written law guides the
amount of discretion that Congress provides judges, making this dependent on the number of words
in a given statute is not a proper measure of discretion. Some statutes may appear short because they
incorporate other, possibly more specific statutes, defining judges’ discretion. Likewise, some
statutes may be very long because they include many details unrelated to judicial discretion.
17. JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993); see also JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
18. Max Schanzenbach & Emerson Tiller, Strategic Judging under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & O RG. 24 (2006) (showing that
the political composition of both circuit courts and district courts affects sentencing decisions). The
authors find that judges appointed by Republicans issued higher sentences for street crimes and
lower sentences for white collar and environmental crimes than their Democratic counterparts. Id. at
52. These authors also analyze how the political composition of the circuits in which they sit affects
district court judges’ sentences. Id. at 44–52.
19. Frank Cross & Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Court of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2155–76 (1998).
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effectively controls lower courts. On one side of the debate, scholars
believe that lower court judges defy precedent issued by higher courts. 20
In many instances higher courts fail to sanction these lower courts for
non-compliance because there are too many lower courts and cases to
monitor. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast show that to deal with its
inability to fully monitor all lower courts, the Supreme Court expands
judicial doctrine to widen the range of acceptable decisions near its ideal
policy.21 McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast specifically state:
When the Supreme Court’s resources are extensive and most lower
courts do not disagree substantially with the Court, the Court can enforce
a doctrine that focuses narrowly on its preferred interpretation. In
contrast, when most lower courts differ substantially from the preferred
doctrine of the Supreme Court, the problem of noncompliance becomes
important. Our theory suggests that the Supreme Court will expand the
range of lower court decisions that it finds acceptable when faced with
substantial noncompliance by the lower courts. By expanding the latitude
allowed under its precedents, the Court both cajoles some lower bench
jurists to abide by the new precedents and isolates those who do not. The
Court can then focus its attention on the most egregiously
nonconforming lower court decisions, and on the issues it most cares
about.22
By cajoling lower courts to comply with Supreme Court doctrine, the
higher court is in fact curtailing the independence of lower court judges,
who have their own individual preferences and ideology. Thus, within
the judiciary, lower court judges are arguably not independent of senior
appellate judges or the preferences of these judges. In this way, these
authors find that stare decisis is a “self-enforcing equilibrium in strategic
interaction for the Supreme Court and lower courts” and that the greater
the potential for non-compliance by lower courts, the more lax is judicial
doctrine. 23
On the other side of the debate regarding higher court precedent are
20. Many scholars believe that lower court judges are unconcerned with being reversed, and
consequently the fear of reversal does not drive their actions. See JACK PELATSON, FIFTY-EIGHT
LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971) (providing one of
the first analyses that show that district court judges did not comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
precedent in desegregation cases); B.C. Canon & D. Jaros, External Variables, Institutional
Structure and Dissent on State Supreme Courts, 4 POLITY 185 (1974); see also David Klein &
Robert Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC ’Y
REV. 579, 602 (2003) (suggesting that while lower courts seem to comply with higher courts, it is
not due to a fear of reversal from these higher courts, but rather due to shortcuts judges must make in
order to handle heavy case loads).
21. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule
of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636–40 (1995) (explaining how the Supreme Court “induces” the
lower courts to comply with the Supreme Court’s own doctrinal choices).
22. Id. at 1634.
23. Id. at 1635.
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scholars who generally believe that lower courts are loyal to and comply
with higher court precedent.24 These scholars not only vary in
methodology, but also differ in the justifications provided for why these
courts comply. Songer, Segal, and Cameron argue that the Supreme
Court controls the discretion of circuit court judges due to its position in
the judicial hierarchy.25 These scholars find that in search and seizure
cases, the courts of appeal are highly congruent (i.e. follow Supreme
Court policy) and responsive (i.e. change policy when the Supreme Court
changes). Songer, Segal, and Cameron conclude that in the limited
instances when the courts of appeals fail to comply, they are prevented
from excessive shirking as a result of litigants who sound fire alarms
when the lower appeals courts’ interpretation diverges too greatly from
the Supreme Court.26
For some scholars, arguing that lower courts comply with higher
court precedent, compliance is due to lower court judges’ fear of reversal
by a higher court.27 Alternatively, Klein and Hume suggest that lower
24. Many political scientists, studying public law and judicial politics, find that a variety of
lower courts follow the precedent set by higher courts. Although many lawyers assume that lower
courts follow higher court precedent, some scholars analyze the theory behind this assumption and
also test it using quantitative methods. See Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Courts to
Court of Appeals Politics: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217, 223 (1980) (assessing how well
district courts follow precedent set by courts of appeals); Sara Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled:
An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J.
POL. 534, 534 (2002) (finding that “unanimity, complexity, and the age of overruled precedent, as
well as the likelihood of Supreme Court review,” all affect how lower courts respond to Supreme
Court precedent); Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 872 (1994) (reviewing the various theoretical arguments supporting the necessity
of lower courts to follow higher court precedent); John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Law
of Libel: Compliance by Lower Federal Courts 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517 (1980) (showing that district
courts and courts of appeals comply with Supreme Court precedent in libel suits); Charles Johnson,
Law, Politics and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court
Decisions, 21(2) LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 325, 338 (1987) (indicating that lower courts tend to follow
the Supreme Court “if facts, issues, or (especially) litigants are generally similar between cases in
the two courts”); Donald Songer and Reginald Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and
Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Court of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297,
313(1990) (showing that the courts of appeals have high rates of compliance with two major U.S.
Supreme Court decisions). However, courts of appeals are less likely to follow Supreme Court
reasoning than lower district courts. Johnson, supra note 24, at 338; see also, SARAH BENESH, THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF C ONFESSIONS : PERSPECTIVES ON THE H IERARCHY OF
JUSTICE (2002); Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal & Charles Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice:
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
673 (1994); Donald Songer, The Impact of Supreme Court Trends in Economic Policy Making in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830 (1987).
25. Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 24, at 673–96.
26. Id.
27. Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77 (1994) (stating that there is much anecdotal
knowledge suggesting that judges fear being reversed because their colleagues will not respect them
and that high rates of reversal may hinder professional advancement); see also H.W. Elder, Property
Rights Structures and Criminal Courts: An Analysis of State Criminal Courts, 7 INT’L. REV. L. &
ECON. 21 (1987); W. Hansen, Robert Johnson, & Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts, Bureaucratic

1]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES & JUDICIAL DISCRETION

9

court compliance is derived from shortcuts for coping with increased
caseloads and the desire “to reach legally sound decisions.”28 Still others
believe that lower court compliance is due to lower court judges’ training
or belief that they are required to follow precedent set by higher courts.
Compliance is viewed as a manifestation of respect for higher court
authority, 29 or as a belief that to do so is a major part of their job as
judges. Alternatively, Johnson30 and Kornhauser31 imply that following
higher court decisions results in more consistent or accurate decisions.
This Article specifically tests whether lower federal courts comply
with legislative mandates in the form of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
and reform as well as with Supreme Court precedent. This is done in two
ways. First, sentencing cases, with identical fact patterns, where
Guideline sentencing ranges are applied are compared to cases where
Guideline ranges are not applied. Second, changes in the sentencing
Guideline scheme mandated by both Congress and the Supreme Court
that restricted or expanded discretion are analyzed. For this part of the
analysis, the following changes to the Guidelines are tested: (1) The
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, 32 [“the PROTECT Act”] and the
controversial Feeney Amendment, in which Congress restricted the
ability of judges and prosecutors to depart from sentencing guidelines,
(2) Blakely v. Washington,33 in which the Supreme Court found that the
Washington state guideline system was unconstitutional, and (3) United
States v. Booker,34 in which the Supreme Court found the federal
Guideline system unconstitutional and converted the Guidelines from
mandatory to advisory constraints on judges’ sentencing discretion. The
PROTECT Act limited judicial discretion while the two Supreme Court

Agencies and the Politics of U.S. Trade Policy, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 529 (1995).
28. Klein & Hume, supra note 20, at 602; see also VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL, JUDGING
ON A C OLLEGIAL C OURT: I NFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (2006); BENESH,
supra note 24.
29. See generally, Lawrence Baum, Lower Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions:
Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1977); Richard Pacelle & Lawrence Baum,
Supreme Court Authority in the Judiciary: A Study of Remands, 20 AM. POL. Q. 169 (1992).
30. Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court
Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW & SOC’ Y REV. 325, 338–39 (1987) (suggesting that
judges often follow the legal reasoning in precedent as opposed to following personal political
philosophy).
31. Lewis Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1605–07 (1995) (viewing the judicial
system as a team that “seeks to maximize the expected number of ‘correct’ answers”).
32. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21. See USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, app. B (analyzing the
complete legislative background of the PROTECT Act).
33. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
34. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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cases expanded it. The legal changes are used to analyze whether lower
courts comply with both mandates from Congress and the Supreme
Court.
III. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A TEST CASE IN
LIMITING DISCRETION BY LIMITING JUDICIAL CHOICES
Prior to the Guideline system implementation in 1989, judges had
broad discretion to determine criminal sentences and parole boards had
the power to reduce these sentences by freeing defendants from prison
after only serving part of their sentences. While this system had certain
advantages, allowing judges to fashion sentences based on defendants’
education, work experience, age, and likelihood of committing other
crimes; 35 many in the legal community were concerned with the
disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants across the nation.
This concern, exhibited in the 1950s and 1960s, manifested itself in
Congressional debates concerning the federal criminal code and
sentencing disparity.36 This in turn led to the introduction of substantial
sentencing reform legislation by Senator Edward Kennedy in 1975. 37
After significant bipartisan efforts, as part of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, Congress finally enacted the concept of sentencing guidelines
and established the United States Sentencing Commission (“USSC”), an
independent agency of the judicial branch. The Guidelines, however, did
not become effective until 1989, when the Supreme Court found that the
USSC and the Guidelines were constitutional. In Mistretta v. United
States,38 the Supreme Court held that in establishing the USSC and

35. To supplement my understanding of judicial decision-making in sentencing, I conducted
interviews of district court judges in the Southern, Eastern, and Central judicial districts of California
between May 2007 and June 2008. During an interview, one senior-status district court judge, who
had served both prior to and after the enactment of the federal Guidelines, stated he had enjoyed the
flexibility of the pre-Guideline system allowing him to give young defendants suspended sentences
after serving one or two days in county jail so as to dissuade them from committing further crimes.
Interview with federal district court judge in S.D. California. (May 9, 2007).
36. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, app. B; William Wilkins, Phyllis Newton & John
Steer, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing
Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 366 (1991).
37. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, B-3.
38. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court held that the power of the United
States Sentencing Commission (USSC) to set Sentencing Guidelines for federal courts was neither
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, nor a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
The original case was brought by a defendant indicted in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri. Mistretta 488 U.S. at 370. This defendant argued that the
Guidelines were invalid because the manner in which the USSC had been created violated the
doctrine of separation of powers and that Congress had delegated excessive legislative authority to
the USSC in relation to its powers to set guidelines. Id. The District Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Guidelines. Id. Although the defendant originally filed a notice of appeal to
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allowing it to create the Guidelines, Congress had violated neither
doctrine of separation of powers nor non-delegation.39
In enacting the Guidelines and amendments, the USSC and the
legislature were given almost exclusive authority to shape how judges
could make decisions for certain types of federal criminal cases. In other
words, the USSC and Congress could specifically mandate what factors
judges could consider in sentencing decisions and could limit their
choice of sentences. Pursuant to the United States Code, amendments to
the Guidelines suggested by the USSC become enforceable if Congress
does not affirmatively overturn them within a 180-day waiting period. 40
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, both the defendant and the prosecution
subsequently petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. Id. at 361.
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Marshall,
Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and in pertinent part Brennan, the Supreme Court held that in
establishing the USSC and allowing it to create Sentencing Guidelines, Congress had not violated
the non-delegation doctrine, because Congress itself had previously defined important criminal
offenses and established gradations of punishment. As to the non-delegation doctrine, the Supreme
Court indicated the following:
[The Guidelines] do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public or vest in the
Judicial Branch the legislative responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum
penalties for every crime. They do no more than fetter the discretion of sentencing judges
to do what they have done for generations–impose sentences within the broad limits
established by Congress.
....
. . . Judicial contribution to the enterprise of creating rules to limit the discretion of
sentencing judges does not enlist the resources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in
either the legislative business of determining what conduct should be criminalized or the
executive business of enforcing the law.
Id. at 407. According to the Supreme Court, the USSC’s Guidelines were similar to internal
regulations enacted by courts. Id. at 391.
Scalia was the lone Justice to dissent to the substance of the majority opinion. His dissent
was based only on the non-delegation doctrine. Justice Scalia wrote that the Sentencing Reform Act
that established the USSC was an invalid delegation of legislative power and authority because the
USSC’s rule-making power in establishing Guidelines was a legislative power and not a part of a
valid exercise of judicial or executive power. Id. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia opined that
Congress established the Commission only to exercise law-making powers that are exclusively
reserved for the legislature. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
The majority also ruled that the establishment of the USSC in the judicial branch did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine for several reasons, but most importantly because the
functions of the USSC to establish rules and make judgments about sentencing were deemed
appropriate for the judicial branch. Id. at 408. Furthermore, the creation of the USSC did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine because the USSC was not a court and did not hear individual
cases and thus did not improperly unite judicial and political power. Id.
The effect of the Mistretta decision has been far reaching. Sentencing Guidelines
established by the USSC and upheld by Mistretta and their amendments were applied to
approximately 700,000 federal criminal cases between 1989 and 2005 when the Supreme Court in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), found that the Guidelines were unconstitutional and
rendered their further use as advisory only, rather than mandatory constraints on district court
judges.
39. Id. at 412.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
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The Guidelines enacted by the USSC indicate how much discretion
judges can exercise depending on the fact pattern of particular cases and
the role that prosecutors take in advocating Guideline departures.
The Guidelines and their amendments have been applied to more
than 700,000 federal criminal cases between 1989 and 2005,41 when the
Supreme Court in United States v. Booker42 found the Guidelines
unconstitutional and rendered their further use to be only advisory, rather
than mandatory constraints on district court judges. Until the Booker
decision the USSC used the Guidelines as a vehicle for constraining the
authority of district court judges by specifying the actual amount of
discretion that judges had to sentence defendants in particular types of
cases. Through Guidelines, the USSC and Congress specifically chose to
limit federal judges’ discretion by mandating that judges sentence
defendants to specific amounts of time in prison which fall within a
certain range of possible sentences in a sentencing table. 43 Although the
Guidelines limited district court discretion, they also limited the ability
of circuit courts to review district court sentences. Most sentences were
reached by plea bargains (studied extensively in this article), and in many
cases defendants waived their rights to appeal to a higher court in the
plea bargain itself.
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN O VERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION (2005) 2, http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf.
42. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2005). Below is a partial depiction
of Sentencing Table, Offense levels range from 1 to 43, with 1 referring to the least serious crimes or
facts.
Table N1. Partial depiction of sentencing table in months in prison (Source: USSC)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
Offense
I
II
III
IV
V

Zone A
Zone B

Zone C

…

Zone D

VI

Level

(0-1)

(2-3)

(4,5,6)

(7,8,9)

(10,11,
12)

(13 or
more)

1

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

2

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

0-6

1-7

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

27
28
29

78-97
78-108
97-108

87-108
97-121
108-135

100-125
110-137
121-151

120-150
130-162
140-175

130-162
140-185
151-188

.
.

70-87
78-97
87108
.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

43

life

Life

Life

Life

Life

Life
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Specifically, lower district court judges determine criminal sentences
by using the USSC’s sentencing table. The table has two axes: a
horizontal axis which determines a defendant’s criminal history category
and a vertical axis which classifies the severity of a defendant’s offense.
To determine the sentence of any offense under the Guidelines, judges
first must determine a defendant’s criminal history category. Second,
lower court judges must determine the offense level ranging from 1 to
43. The Guidelines categorize crimes by type and the offense level is
based on whether the crime involved certain additional factors, such as
the presence of a firearm or a victim. The offense level may be further
altered depending on defendant’s role in the crime and his acceptance of
responsibility. 44
Once these two determinations have been made, the district court
judge (until the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker) was required
to sentence a defendant to a prison term that fell within the range
determined by the intersection of the criminal history and offense level
axes of the sentencing table. In other words, the sentencing table was a
mandatory constraint on judicial discretion. In this way, judicial
discretion in sentencing decisions was limited to sentencing choices
defined by the table ranges that varied as little as six months (i.e. 0 to 6
months or 24-30 months) to those that varied by as much as the length of
time between 360 months (30 years) to a defendant’s natural life. As a
result, discretion to sentence was “cabined within a guideline range that
may be a small fraction of the statutory limit.” 45 The legislature, upon the
recommendation of the USSC, determines this range specifically.
Furthermore, when particular offenses have statutory minimum or
maximum sentences, the statutory limit is generally controlling.
However, in certain instances, judges may apply a “safety valve”
provision that allows them to sentence below the statutory minimum. I
used cases in which judges applied sentencing table ranges as my control
group to compare to a group of cases where even more discretion is
afforded through the use of departures.
The Sentencing Guidelines also allow judges to exercise their
discretion and depart from the Guideline ranges in very limited
circumstances.46 The limited use of departures has been duly recorded by

44. U.S. SENTENCING G UIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 3 (2005).
45. LUCIEN B. CAMPBELL & HENRY BEMPORAD, AN I NTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL
GUIDELINE SENTENCING 1 (8th ed. 2004) (providing a description of how attorneys should apply the
Federal Guidelines).
46. The only Guideline departures analyzed in this paper are those that are “judge-driven.” It
should be noted, however, that there are “prosecutor-driven” departures where prosecutors and not
judges must initially ask for the departure by motion. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K1.1 (2005). One example of this type of departure exists when prosecutors ask judges to depart
downward from the Guidelines to reward defendants who substantially assisted the government. 18

14

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 24

the USSC which has shown that decisions involving departures
constitute just a small percent of all such sentencing decisions. 47
According to the Guidelines, district court judges may sentence outside
of the fixed ranges or depart due to “specific offender characteristics”
including age, education, and socio-economic background.48 Although
judges may sentence below the Guidelines based on these specific
offender characteristics, the USSC determined that these factors “are not
ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be
outside the applicable guideline range.”49 It should be remembered that
the Guidelines were originally adopted to avoid disparities in sentences
and to treat similar cases similarly. 50 Consequently, the USSC suggested
that special offender characteristics should not be considered except in
certain unusual cases.51
Departures also may be warranted when “the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the USSC in formulating the
Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described.”52 The Guidelines include a list of twenty specific exceptions
which allow judges to depart from the Guidelines. 53 Some of these
U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006). Substantial assistance departures are warranted only if the government
requests such a departure by motion and the judge grants the motion. See Stefanos Bibas,
Federalism: Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2005)
(showing that whether departures from substantial assistance are warranted is largely driven by
prosecutorial, rather than judicial discretion and may vary with regional practices of prosecutors’
offices).
47. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at 31.
48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2008). Guideline
§§ 5H1.1 to 5H1.12 list the following specific offender characteristics:
1) age, 2) education and vocational skills, 3) mental and emotional conditions, 4) physical
condition including drug or alcohol dependence or abuse; gambling addiction, 5)
employment record, 6) family ties and responsibilities 7) role in the offense, 8) criminal
history, 9) dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood, 10) race, sex, national
origin, creed, religion and socio-economic status, 11) military, civic, charitable or public
service, employment related contributions, record of prior good works, 12) lack of
guidance as a youth, 13) relief from disability.
49. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.
50. Id. § 1A1.1, p.s. (“Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar conduct by similar offenders.”).
51. Id. ch.5, pt. H1.1. For specific offender characteristics, see the policy statement at page
444.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553b(1). Section 3553 is now used as the legal basis given by district court
judges for most departures after U.S. v. Booker rendered the guidelines advisory.
53. See U.S. SENTENCING G UIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.1-2.24 (2008). The twenty-three
“other” grounds for departure found in §§ 5K2.1-5K2.21 include:
1) death, 2) physical injury, 3) extreme psychological injury, 4) abduction or unlawful
restrain, 5) property damage or loss, 6) weapons and dangerous instrumentalities, 7)
disruption of governmental function, 8) extreme conduct, 9) criminal purpose 10)
victim’s conduct, 11) lesser harms, 12) coercion and duress, 13) diminished capacity, 14)
public welfare, 15) voluntary disclosure of offense, 16) semiautomatic firearms capable
of accepting large capacity magazine, 17) violent street gangs 18) post-sentencing
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reasons warrant sentences above the sentencing range, some below the
Guideline table range, and some both above and below the range. One of
the most significant of these departure reasons allows judges to depart
where there are certain circumstances of a kind not adequately taken into
consideration.54 Finally, the government and defendants may reach a plea
agreement that allows for a sentence outside of the sentencing ranges. 55
However, such plea agreements are not binding and the judge has
discretion to disregard them entirely. 56 Judge driven departures serve as a
treatment or test group that I analyze.
IV. CHANGES IN THE GUIDELINE SCHEME
Not only does this article include tests on the effect of the Sentencing
Guideline scheme on sentencing outcomes, but also includes tests
concerning how changes in the law governing this scheme affect
sentences, disparity, and departure rates. This is done using an
interrupted time series to test the applicability of the law after three
major changes to the Guideline scheme described below. Interrupted
time series analysis helps scholars analyze how events, such as changes
in the law, affect the variables of interest over time.
A. The PROTECT Act/Feeney Amendment: Legislation Restricting
Judicial Discretion
On April 30, 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act. 57 Heralded
as the most significant amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines since
their inception, Congress enacted the PROTECT Act because of a
growing concern that judges and prosecutors had increasingly been using
departures to avoid the Guidelines’ sentencing mandates especially in
cases along the southwestern border and in cases involving child
exploitation.58 Further, in enacting this law, Congress also voiced
concern that federal prosecutors were using departures and case facts as
rehabilitative efforts, 19) aberrant behavior, 20) dismissed and uncharged conduct. 21)
Specific offender characteristics for downward departure in child crimes and sexual
offenses, 22) discharged terms of imprisonment, 23) commission of offense while
wearing or displaying unauthorized or counterfeit insignia or uniform.
Note: section 5K2.15 was deleted. Further, this list of grounds for departures has changed slightly
since the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines as referenced in the legislative history of each
section referenced. See pages 459 to 468.
54. Id. § 5K2.0(2).
55. Id. §§ 6B1.1-1.2.
56. Id. § 6B1.1. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
57. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21 [hereinafter “PROTECT Act”].
58. See generally USSC report, 2003, supra note 4.
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bargaining chips to get the sentences they desired, in blatant disregard of
Congressional intent as demonstrated in the Sentencing Guidelines. 59
The PROTECT Act had four major provisions. First, the Act sought
to prohibit departures related to crimes against children and sex
offenses.60 Second, it changed the standard of review by appellate courts
for “sentencing matters” to de novo, while continuing the standard of
clearly erroneous for factual determinations. 61 Third, the controversial
Feeney Amendment required district courts to provide specific written
reasons for departures from the Guidelines. 62 Fourth, the Act enhanced
the pre-existing requirements that courts report on sentences to the
USSC.63 The Commission published the related amendments to the
Guidelines on May 16, August 1, and October 21, 2003.64
Although the PROTECT Act/Feeney Amendment changed the
departure scheme generally, Congress directed that the USSC thoroughly
review all sentencing practices according to the intent of the legislature
and that it make its own recommendations as to specific changes in the
Guidelines.65 On October 8, 2003, the USSC adopted emergency
amendments effective on October 21, 2003.66 The amendments that the
USSC proposed with the acquiescence of Congress, as well as actions
taken by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, in conjunction with the
PROTECT Act, substantially changed the Guideline departure system.
To meet Congressional concerns regarding departures, the USSC

59. See generally USSC report, 2003, supra note 4, app. B (providing a history and analysis
of the issues giving rise to the PROTECT Act); Interviews of district court judges in S.D. Cal. (May
7 and May 11, 2007) (confirming that prosecutors’ charging practices had indeed resulted in
unwarranted sentencing disparity and that prosecutors in certain districts were so lenient as to ignore
the Guidelines’ intent and purposes).
60. PROTECT Act, supra note 57 § 401(b).
61. Id. § 401(d)(2).
62. Id. § 401(c); see Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing
Practices? The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 1, 10 (2005) (providing a complete discussion of the Feeney Amendment). Although the Act
placed more rigid restrictions on reporting departures, the USSC had always had a Congressional
mandate to collect and disseminate data on sentences imposed and district court judges’ use of and
reasons for departures. See 28 U.S.C. §§994(w), 995(a)(8) (2008).
63. PROTECT Act, supra note 57 § 401(h).
64. Notice of (1)(A)(i) Congressional Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Made
Directly by the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108–21, and Effective April 30, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg.
26,960 (May 16, 2003). The Commission stated that these amendments did not comply with the
normal notice and public comment rules and deadlines because Congress enacted the changes
effective on April 30, 2003, making “it impracticable to publish the conforming amendments in the
Federal Register to provide an opportunity for public comment before the congressional
amendments became effective.” Id. (Emphasis added). Further amendments were published at 68
Federal Register 39173 (August 1, 2003) and 68 Federal Register 60153-60176 (October 21, 2003).
See, http://www.ussc.gov/notice.htm for a complete list of the amendments and federal register
notices.
65. Id. § 401(m).
66. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at v.
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eliminated nine grounds for departures. Two of these grounds related to
criminal history categories and two related to departures based on
aberrant behavior. The remaining five now “forbidden” departures
included
[1] the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the offense; [2]
the defendant’s aggravating or mitigating role in the offense; [3] the
defendant’s decision, by itself, to plead guilty to the offense or to enter
into a plea agreement with respect to the offense; [4] the defendant’s
fulfillment of restitution obligations only to the extent required by law;
and [5] the defendant’s addiction to gambling. 67
The USSC amendments also increased restrictions for using
departures based on multiple factors, a defendant’s family ties and
responsibilities, conduct of the victim, coercion and duress, and
diminished capacity.68
While the PROTECT Act required the USSC to draft extensive
amendments to the Guideline system, it also directed the Department of
Justice to enact detailed policies and procedures to ensure that the
Guidelines would be followed by federal prosecutors when designing
plea bargains and that assistant U.S. attorneys would oppose departures if
they were “not supported by the facts and the law.” 69 As a result, then
U.S. Attorney Ashcroft also required attorneys to affirmatively oppose
sentencing adjustments and downward departures that were not
consistent with the facts and the law and to follow a more rigorous
appeals protocol.70
Most controversially, as directed by Congress in the PROTECT Act,
Ashcroft established a system for reporting to Congress how individual
federal judges handled sentencing. One commentator claimed “that last
mandate to monitor downward departures was particularly worrisome to
judges, who saw it as an intimidation tactic and a serious encroachment
on the independence of the judiciary.”71 In fact, several district court
judges expressed anger at the PROTECT Act and one judge saw it as a
direct threat from a co-equal branch of government.72 The U.S. Judicial
Conference opposed the Amendment publicly. 73 It has been suggested
67. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at vi, 19–20.
68. Id. at vii, 19.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to all
Assistant U.S. Attorneys regarding Departmental Guidance on Sentencing Recommendations and
Appeals
(July
28,
2003),
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf.
71. Dan Christensen, The Short Life of the Feeney Amendment, DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 24,
2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105968948840.
72. Interview with U.S. District Court Judge from the C.D. of Cal. (Nov. 29, 2007).
73. Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Commission’s
Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 98, 98 (2003).
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that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Booker may have been
motivated in part by Congress’s strict monitoring of judges under the
PROTECT Act.74
On September 22, 2003, Ashcroft distributed a more detailed
memorandum regarding policy changes consistent with the PROTECT
Act. 75 This memorandum reiterated that prosecutors should allow
departures in only very “rare” circumstances and set forth “limited”
exceptions for allowing departures.76 Further, Ashcroft ordered
prosecutors not to “fact bargain” or accept a plea agreement.
B. Blakely and Booker: Supreme Court Cases Augmenting Judicial
Discretion
As stated above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became effective
in 1989. From that time, until the decision in United States v. Booker on
January 12, 2005, the Guidelines were deemed mandatory constraints on
judicial decision-making. The mandatory nature of the Guidelines was
later called into question in the Supreme Court case of Blakely v.
Washington,77 which challenged the Washington State Sentencing
Guideline scheme. In this case, the defendant had plead guilty to
kidnapping his estranged wife. 78 The State recommended a sentence
within the Guideline range of forty-nine to fifty-three months. 79
However, after hearing the wife’s account of the kidnapping, the judge
sentenced the defendant to ninety months, which was thirty-seven
months greater than the maximum prescribed by the guidelines. 80 After
the defendant objected to this increase, the judge held a three-day bench
hearing to take testimony, but still chose to uphold the exceptional
sentence based on deliberate cruelty.81
The Supreme Court in Blakely explicitly stated that its decision was
based on the application of the prior rule it had enunciated in Apprendi v.
New Jersey82 which was that “other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
74. See Christensen, supra note 71.
75. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to all
Assistant U.S. Attorneys regarding Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited
Disposition or “Fast Track” Prosecution Program in a District (September 22, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-092203.pdf.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 523 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (previously calling the federal guidelines into question).
78. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298.
79. Id. at 298.
80. Id. at 300.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 301.
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statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”83 The Court applied Apprendi to the defendant’s case
despite the fact that it involved a plea bargain rather than a jury trial,
because the defendant had not admitted the facts leading to the judge’s
elevated sentence in the plea bargain. 84
While Blakely involved a state guideline scheme, the Court’s
dissenters questioned, but did not decide, the issue of whether the
Federal Guidelines, similar to the Washington Guidelines, were
constitutional as mandatory constraints. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor,
joined by Justice Breyer, emphasized the negative impact that Blakely
would have on the Federal guideline system. O’Connor stated:
The legacy of today’s opinion, whether intended or not, will be the
consolidation of sentencing power in the State and Federal Judiciaries.
The Court says to Congress and state legislatures: If you want to
constrain the sentencing discretion of judges and bring some uniformity
to sentencing, it will cost you –dearly. Congress and States, faced with
the burdens imposed by the extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), to the present context, will either trim or eliminate
altogether their sentencing guidelines schemes and, with them, 20 years
of sentencing reform. It is thus of little moment that the majority does not
expressly declare guidelines schemes unconstitutional, ante, at 308; for
as residents of “Apprendi-land” are fond of saying, “the relevant inquiry
is one not of form but of effect.” Apprendi, supra, at 494; Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (SCALIA, J., concurring). The “effect”
of today’s decision will be greater judicial discretion and less uniformity
in sentencing. 85
Although Blakely did not challenge the Federal Guidelines,
following this decision, many district court judges subsequently refused
to use the Guidelines to sentence defendants, reasoning that Blakely dicta
showed that the Guidelines were unconstitutional86
Sixth months after Blakely, in United States v. Booker,87 the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
also applied to cases involving the federal Sentencing Guidelines. 88
83. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
84. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–304.
85. Id. at 314 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
86. See Memorandum from Kelly Land (Staff Attorney) to Tim McGrath (Staff Director),
Re: Office of General Counsel’s Blakely Database (November 30, 2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/11_30_04.pdf (enumerating district courts’ decisions that questioned
the constitutionality and continued application of the guidelines in individual cases immediately
following Blakely).
87. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
88. It was no coincidence that Booker was decided six months after the Blakely decision.
After diverse lower court reaction to this decision, Congress and the executive requested the
Supreme Court to expedite a decision on the constitutionality of the Federal Guidelines. See Timothy
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Booker involved two lower court decisions. In defendant Booker’s case,
the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court had violated Apprendi by
sentencing the defendant to prison time greater than the Guideline range,
which was based on additional findings made by the judge under the
preponderance of the evidence standard. 89 In defendant Fanfan’s case,
the lower court refused to add time to the sentence, despite findings of
additional facts that allegedly warranted a greater sentence based on
Blakely.90 In Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that Blakely did
indeed apply to the Federal Guidelines. The Court also reaffirmed the
Apprendi rule that any additional facts supporting a sentence greater than
the Federal Guideline maximum must be admitted by a defendant in a
plea agreement or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 91
While Booker held that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, this did not result in the demise of the
Guideline system. Instead, the Justices reasoned that severing the section
of the Guidelines rendering them mandatory would remedy the Sixth
Amendment problem they had identified. 92 As a result, Booker converted
the Guidelines from mandatory constraints on judicial discretion to
purely advisory.93 In essence, the Justices argued that faced with the
Sixth Amendment challenge, Congress would not have intended to
invalidate the entire Federal Guideline scheme, but would seek to
preserve it in any way possible. 94 For the Justices in Booker, such
preservation was only possible by rendering the scheme advisory. 95 The
Supreme Court’s conversion of the Guidelines to advisory constraints
also ended the Congressional requirements of reporting adverse
departures of individual sentencing judges to Congress as required by the
PROTECT Act.96
In Booker’s wake, district court judges were instructed to use the
now advisory Sentencing Guidelines as one of the many factors to
consider when determining the appropriateness of a defendant’s
sentence. 97 Furthermore, the Supreme Court mandated a
Lynch, One Cheer for U.S. v. Booker, 2004-05 CATO SUP. CT. REV., 223 (2005); Lyle Denniston,
Justices Agree to Consider Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A14.
89. Booker, 543 U.S. at 222–23.
90. Id. at 220.
91. Id. at 268.
92. Id. at 227.
93. Id. at 233.
94. Id. at 249.
95. Id.at 246. District court judges have emphasized the conversion of the Guidelines from
mandatory to advisory constraints. In sentencing hearings I observed on May 9 and May 18, 2007 in
the District Court for the Southern District of California, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys
always prefaced reference to guidelines as “advisory” (i.e. “the Advisory Guidelines”).
96. Christensen, supra note 71.
97. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).
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“reasonableness” standard for appellate review of district court
sentences.98 Subsequent to the decision in Booker, the definition of
reasonableness was addressed by the circuit courts in a variety of
conflicting and controversial ways.99 Finally, in Kimbrough v. United
States100 and Gall v. United States101 the Supreme Court expanded
district court discretion by providing guidance on the meaning of
reasonable sentences. Although outside of the scope of this article, the
Supreme Court’s 2007 decisions in Kimbrough and Gall broadened
district court discretion and signaled that after Booker, courts of appeals
should give district courts’ sentences great deference. 102
V. TESTING THE EFFECTS OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE SCHEME
Studies of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 103 of which there are
many, analyze different crimes and case facts together, controlling only
for a limited number of case variables. However, these studies fail to
control for the vast majority of case facts that vary among seemingly
similar cases and that would dictate different outcomes. As a result,
almost all prior analyses suffer from serious omitted variable bias. 104 In
98. Booker, 543 U.S. at 262.
99. See
Selected
Guideline
Application
decisions
by
circuit
at
www.ussc.gov/training/court.htm.
100. 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).
101. 128 S. Ct. 586, 602 (2007).
102. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (holding that a district court was justified in sentencing
outside the guidelines and finding that the controversial crack/powder disparity was at odds with
§3553(a)). The Supreme Court further held that because the guidelines were no longer mandatory
under Booker, there was no longer any reason to believe that the disparate ranges given for crack and
powder cocaine offenses were likewise mandatory. Id.; see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586 (regarding
standards of review). In Gall, the Supreme Court held that while the difference between a sentence
and the guideline range was relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences (whether inside or
outside of the Guidelines) under a “deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Id .
103. U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF SENTENCING REFORM (2004) [hereinafter USSC Report, 2004] (analyzing a multitude of studies
concerning the effectiveness of the Guidelines). The studies and their descriptions are found in
chapter 3 of the report. Id. at 79-112.
104. Omitted variable bias means that the researcher has left out an important variable that
may have caused changes in the dependent variable. Omitted variable bias results in researchers
assuming that certain independent variables show clear causation when the real variable of causation
has been omitted.
The only study that provided an analysis similar to the one employed here, which
controls for case fact variation in order to avoid omitted variable bias, is one conducted by the USSC
in 1991. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE G UIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-T ERM IMPACTS ON D ISPARITY IN
SENTENCING AND USE OF I NCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1991) [hereinafter USSC Report, 1991] (summarizing the
findings of a preliminary analysis of the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on sentences use a case
fact matching procedure). The USSC’s 1991 analysis compared sentences for several crimes based
on specific fact patterns prior to the Guidelines and after the Guidelines. The sample of Guideline
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other words, most studies of the Guidelines to date do not adequately
consider how the facts of the cases may drive the decisions that judges
are making. This study substantially advances our understanding of the
Guidelines by analyzing cases with similar case facts. In this way,
matching of case facts allows for an analysis of the law’s impact free
from analysis limitations where facts rather than law may be driving case
outcomes.
To examine the effect of the legal constraints on judicial discretion
found in the Guidelines, case facts are matched and thus controlled for in
order to specifically test the effect of the law on sentencing outcomes.
The case pattern matching eliminates issues of unconfoundedness 105 and
the comparison of dissimilar cases. This is an improvement over other
empirical studies that attempt to test the effect of the Guidelines by
comparing all types of cases without controlling specifically for facts. 106
Here, two drug trafficking crimes that differ only as to drug amounts are
used for the analysis.107 The first crime [hereinafter “drug crime #1” or
cases was very small. The USSC analyzed cases involving heroin and cocaine distribution that were
similar to cases analyzed here except that the drug amounts were smaller. The results of the preguideline analysis by the Sentencing Commission was as follows:
Table N2. Pre-guideline case statistics.
Statistic

Heroin Distribution
(100g – 400g)

Cocaine Distribution
(500g – 2kg)

Minimum sentence

0.00

0.00

Maximum sentence

180.00

108.00

Mean

40.18

31.66

Standard Deviation

40.17

22.92

N

40

81

Id. at 295, 298. Although not a perfect pre-test, the above results are instructive for a general
comparison of pre-guideline sentencing, showing that the standard deviation and thus variance of
sentencing decisions was fairly significant prior to the Guidelines.
105. Guido Imbens & Jeffrey Wooldridge, What’s New in Econometrics: Estimation of
Average Treatment Effect under Unconfoundedness, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SUMMER INSTITUTE (July 30, 2007) (video and slides available at www.nber.org). According to
Imbens and Wooldridge, “Unconfoundedness. . . refers to the case where (non-parametrically)
adjusting for differences in a fixed set of covariates removes biases in comparisons between treated
and control units, thus allowing for a causal interpretation of those adjusted differences.” Id. at 1. By
ensuring that observations or cases in a study are substantially similar, the effect of a treatment, such
as a law or policy intervention, can be isolated.
106. See USSC Report, 2004, supra note 103 (summarizing quantitative studies on the impact
of the Guidelines using a methodology that analyzes all case types together).
107. U. S. SENTENCING G UIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (2005) (showing the difference in drug
amounts for the two crimes analyzed here).
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“amount #1”] involves smaller quantities of four drugs (cocaine, heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamine) than the second crime [hereinafter
“drug crime #2” or “amount #2”]. The cases are matched by analyzing
only those cases with substantially similar facts and relatively simple fact
patterns. Specifically, these cases involve identical single convictions
after guilty pleas of conspiracy to transport certain controlled substances
under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and fall under the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Guideline Manual, §2D1.1. All of the cases involved one
of four possible drugs; namely, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamine and carried a statutory minimum sentence of 10
years.108 Despite the statutory minimum, the respective judge applied a
safety valve provision allowing him or her to sentence defendants below
this minimum under certain circumstances. 109 In all of the cases,
defendants had a criminal history level of I, meaning that defendants had
no prior convictions or only one prior conviction with a sentence of less
than 60 days. 110 Additionally, the defendants in all of these cases
accepted responsibility for their crimes such that the original base
offense level was reduced by three points (i.e. setting guideline ranges at
70 to 87 months in prison for drug amount #1 and 87 to 108 months for
drug amount #2). Furthermore, there was no adjustment in the sentence
due to the defendant’s role in the offense.
To test simply whether the mandated use of the sentencing table in
the Guideline scheme affects case outcomes, the cases are further
subdivided into either a control or treatment group. The control group
included all cases in which judges chose not to depart from the
sentencing table. 111 The second group is a test or treatment group that
included cases where judges used their discretion to depart from the table
ranges. The observations consist of the average sentence for each drug

Table N3. Drug amounts for two crimes analyzed.
Drug
amount
1
2

Heroin

Cocaine

Methamph-etamine

Marijuana

700 G to < 1 KG
1 to < 3 KG

3.5 to < 5KG
5 to < 15KG

350G to < 500G
500G to <1.5 KG

700KG to < 1,000KG
1,000KG to < 3,000KG

These amounts have not changed between 1998 and 2006, the period studied. See 1998 to 2006,
USSG §2D1.1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm.
108. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (2006).
109. 18 U.S.C. §3553(f) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5C1.2, 410-12
(2008).
110. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §4A1.1 (2008). To receive a criminal history
point, the prior offense carrying a sentence of less than 60 days must have occurred within ten years
of the current offense if the defendant was 18 or over and within five years if the defendant was
under eighteen years old.
111. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2005). Guideline range is a
range of sentences measured in months in prison that is determined from the intersection of offense
level and criminal history on the sentencing table.
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amount, the variance of case outcomes, and an analysis of left and right
censorship of the guideline versus non-guideline cases.
The two groups of cases analyzed are derived from federal
sentencing cases, using databases created by the USSC and deposited
with the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research
(“ICPSR”).112 Out of nearly half a million district court cases, I analyze a
total of 1,752 drug distribution cases with the described fact patterns. Out
of these cases, 1,112 cases had the fact pattern described as Group #1,
and 640 cases involved facts described in Group #2.
A. Guideline Scheme Hypotheses, Predictions, and Results
The two groups of cases, described above, allow for several
hypotheses and predictions regarding the Guideline Scheme as follows:
 Mandatory Guidelines Hypotheses:
H1 = Mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines constrain district
court judges.
 Advisory Guidelines Hypotheses:
H2 = Advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines constrain district
court judges.
The above two hypotheses essentially compare application of the
Sentencing Guidelines when mandatory (prior to Booker) and when
advisory (after Booker). These hypotheses lead to specific predictions
which if true would confirm that judges act differently when their
discretion is constrained by the Guideline sentencing table as compared
to when they were allowed to depart. The predictions are as follows:
1. Prediction 1
If the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ (mandatory or advisory)
sentencing ranges are applied, judges will sentence the majority of all
defendants not only within the Guideline range, but also to the very
minimum of that range, 113 whereas, when judges depart from the
Guidelines, judges will not sentence the majority of defendants to the
112. See ICPSR, supra note 8, for the study numbers.
113. Seventy months for drug amount #1 and eighty-seven months for drug amount #2. See
Guideline table reproduced at supra note 43 (drug amount #1 fits into offense level 27 and drug
amount #2 fits into offense level 29).
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minimum (0 months) of possible sentences.
The logic behind this first prediction is that judges do not like to
have their discretion constrained by Congress. 114 To voice this discontent
and perhaps to exhibit a generally more case-specific approach towards
crime than that desired by elected politicians, judges applying the
sentencing table ranges will consistently choose the minimum sentence
allowed by the Sentencing Guideline ranges. I predict that the majority of
judges who depart from the mandated range will not choose a sentence of
zero or effectively acquit defendants because to do so would represent an
approach to crime that is too soft or liberal for most judges.
2. Prediction 2
The average sentence under the Guideline ranges will be longer than
the average sentence for identical cases where the Guideline ranges are
not applied. Deviations of the actual outcomes from the predicted
outcomes will be negative and significant for non-Guideline range cases
and positive and significant for Guideline cases.
The logic behind this prediction is that when judges apply Guideline
ranges, the sentences will be higher than when they depart from the
ranges.115 This prediction is based on the belief that legislators desire to
appear tough on crime in order to be re-elected, and they thus enact
legislation that raises sentence length. Preferences of politicians for
higher sentences should diverge from preferences of most federal judges
who analyze the law and facts on a case-by-case basis.
3. Prediction 3
The standard deviation of cases sentenced within the Guideline
ranges will be smaller than the standard deviation of cases sentenced
outside these ranges. Moreover, the distribution of sentences for
Guideline cases will be left (lower) censored at the minimum guideline
range amount.
114. During interviews held on May 7, May 9, 2007, and July 6, 2007, some Southern
California district court judges said that they did not like Congress constraining their sentencing
discretion as Congressmen do not have sentencing or criminal law expertise and re-election is their
main motivation for enacting changes in sentencing law.
115. This rather obvious prediction is based on the fact that judges rarely depart above the
Guideline ranges. Instead, the majority of departures are below the Sentencing Guidelines. For
example, in 2008, judges departed above the Guidelines 1.5% of the time, but departed downward
due to substantial assistance 25.6% of the time and for other non-governmental reasons 13.4%. U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Table N (2008),
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/TableN.pdf. This outcome is consistent for all years when the
Guidelines have been in force. These reports are provided by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission,http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm.
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This final prediction is based on one of the underlining intentions of
the Guideline system. 116 Congress enacted the Guidelines in general to
reduce disparities in sentences of identical or similar crimes. 117
Therefore, the variance of sentences when Guideline table ranges are
applied should be smaller than that of sentences when judges depart.
Further, the prediction of the left censorship of cases in which judges do
not depart is based on the general belief that judges would follow the
Guidelines as Congress intended, but sentence on the low end. If the
predictions are validated by the tests, this will show that Guidelines
matter and effectively constrain judges and the Guideline minimums and
maximums serve as effective barriers against unfettered judicial
discretion.
The quantitative results confirm the predictions delineated above and
fail to reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. In other words, Guidelines matter and
constrain judges. However, these constraints are imperfect because they
still provide judges with discretion to depart from the Guidelines. First,
when judges are constrained by the Guidelines, they sentence defendants
to more time in prison than when not constrained by the Guidelines. For
example, in comparing cases from 2004, sentences from the Guideline
group were higher than the sentences from the departure group. The
Guideline group had an average sentence of 71.32 months with a
standard deviation of 3.78. The departure group had an average sentence
of 54.80 months with a standard deviation of 11.69. In fact, on average,
district court judges sentenced defendants to almost 1.4 to 2.8 years more
time when their cases were sentenced inside the Guideline table ranges
as compared to outside (See Table 1 below).
Similarly, for cases in 2004 with drug amount #2, judges sentenced
defendants on average to 88.33 months when the Guidelines were
applied, as compared to an average of 61.40 months when Guidelines
were not applied. Again, even with a higher Guideline range allowed due
to greater quantities of drugs, judges still sentenced defendants to
approximately 2 to 4 years more time in prison when the Guidelines were
applied as compared to when they were not. This pattern, in fact, holds
true for all of the cases from 1999 to the post-Booker cases, and no
differences are seen in the period directly after either the PROTECT Act,
Blakely, or Booker.118
116. The policy has been set out in each Guideline Manual. The policy portions are available
in the introduction. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, 2-5 (2008).
117. Id. The policy statement includes three reasons for the enactment of the Guidelines. One
of these was as follows, “Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the
wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”
Id. at 2.
118. Statistics from ICPSR were collapsed into a data base of drug trafficking cases described
in this article. These smaller data sets are available upon request of the author at lbtiede@uh.edu.
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Table 1. Results of Post-Tests (1999-2006).
Drug
Amount

1

2

Treatment
Guideline
Application
Guidelines
1999
2000
71.06
72.17
(3.29) (4.49)
No Guidelines
1999
2000
50.43
54.67
(11.24) (14.08)
Guidelines
1999
2000
87.78
87.23
(1.97) (1.38)
No Guidelines
1999
2000
65.33 52.33
(11.93) (22.84)

Post-Tests by year
sentence average
(standard deviation)
2001
72.30
(4.90)

2002
71.53
(3.97)

2003
71.07
(3.50)

2004
71.32
(3.78)

2005
71.67
(4.24)

2006
71.27
(3.44)

2001
39.30
(14.85)

2002
43.58
(15.76)

2003
52.41
(13.15)

2004
54.80
(11.69)

2005
51.86
(13.56)

2006
49.60
(19.92)

2001
87.46
(1.84)

2002
89.43
(5.26)

2003
87.72
(2.41)

2004
88.33
(3.39)

2005
88.61
(4.15)

2006
88.65
(4.34)

2001
40.75
(11.76)

2002
62.56
(8.66)

2003
60.86
(17.61)

2004
61.40
(11.27)

2005
65.09
(18.48)

2006
64.28
(18.41)

Note: Sentences are average sentences in months in prison.
Second, the prediction concerning the distribution of minimum
sentences was also borne out by the tests. The sentencing guideline range
for the crime studied with drug amount #1 was 70 to 87 months, allowing
judges the discretion to choose sentences within a seventeen-month
window. The guideline range for the same crime with drug amount #2
was 87 to 108 months, allowing judges the discretion to choose sentences
which could vary as much as 21 months. Despite this 17 to 21 month
spread of sentencing choices, for cases applying the Guideline, district
court judges overwhelmingly sentenced defendants to the minimum
amount of time allowed under the table ranges regardless of what the
Guideline stated minimum was. For the crimes analyzed for 2004, for
drug amount #1, district court judges sentenced defendants to the
minimum sentence of 70 months in prison 84 percent of the time.
Similarly, in 2004, for drug amount #2, judges sentenced defendants to
the minimum sentence of 87 months 83 percent of the time. As indicated
in Table 3, this pattern was repeated for all of the years examined with
the percentage of sentences at the minimum no less than 73 percent and
sometimes as high as 95 percent.
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Table 2 Percent sentenced at minimum by group (1999-2006)
Year

Drug
Amount

1999

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Guideline
Applied
% at 70 or 87
months (expected
100%)
86
82
74
95
80
92
76
73
88
90
84
83
82
83
82
81

Guideline Not
Applied:
(Departures)
% at 0 months
(expected 0%)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
5
0
0

Note: “% at” refers to the percent of cases in which sentences in each
group were 0, 70 or 87 months in prison.
A related prediction about whether judges sentence defendants to the
minimum amount concerned, left censorship of guideline cases as
compared to non-Guideline cases. The Guideline cases were left
censored at the minimum of the Guideline table range. (See Figures 1
and 2 below). Conversely, for non-Guideline cases—judges, as we would
expect—did not sentence the majority of the defendants to the minimum
possible sentence of zero months in prison. For cases based on departures
authorized by the Guidelines, there were no sentences of zero months in
prison for 1999 to 2004. In 2005, district court judges sentenced
defendants in this category to zero months in prison 2 to 5 percent of the
time.
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Sentences for Drug Quantities #1. Guideline Range Cases
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GUIDELINE RANGE: 70 - 87 MONTHS: m= 79.49; SD=3.92; N=987

0

20

40

60 GL minimum 80

Sentence in Months of Prison

Figure 1. Drug amount #1: guideline range cases only (1999-2006)
Sentences for Drug Quantities #2. Guideline Range Cases
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Figure 2. Drug amount #2: guideline range cases only (1999-2006)
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Third, the predictions regarding the standard deviation 119 and
distribution of cases were also confirmed. The standard deviation of total
sentences for Guideline table range cases was considerably smaller than
the standard deviation for non-Guideline cases in all of the tests.
Conversely, sentences had a greater standard deviation and thus varied
more widely when judges were not constrained by the Guidelines. As
seen in Table 2, for 2004, the standard deviation, for cases sentenced
under the Guidelines for drug amount #1 and #2, was about three times
smaller than those not sentenced under the Guidelines. In fact, in all
instances examined the standard deviation for cases sentenced under the
Guidelines was considerably smaller than that for cases sentenced
outside of the Guidelines. This result persisted even after Booker.
Cases where advisory guidelines were applied had considerably less
variance than cases with observed departures. This conclusion was
supported by district court judges interviewed in 2007, who claimed that
after Booker, they still follow the Guidelines most of the time and in the
same manner as prior to Booker.120
B. Changes in the Law Hypotheses and Results
Besides testing the effect of the overall Guideline scheme, I also test
whether reforms to that scheme affected case outcomes. The effects of
reforms to the Sentencing Guidelines on case outcomes are tested using
an interrupted time series analyses. The hypotheses for the reforms in
law are as follows:121
 H3 = Legal reforms which decrease judicial discretion will:
a) Increase sentence length
b) Decrease disparity
c) Decrease the number of departures

119. Variance of sentences is a measure of how widely individual district court judges’
sentences vary from each other. It is measured by the standard deviation or square root of the
variance defined as the spread of possible sentences around the average of all sentences.
120. District court judge interviews, supra note 35.
121. Hypothesis testing allows social scientists to determine the causal relationship between
variables of interest. Basic regression analysis allows social scientists to determine the degree that
one variable (i.e. a dependent variable) is explained by another variable (i.e. the independent
variable). For this part of the analysis, the dependent variables are such things as a) sentence length,
b) disparity, and c) number of departures. The main causal or independent variables are the decision
to depart as well as legal reforms that increase judicial discretion (i.e. U.S. v. Booker) or decrease it
(i.e. the PROTECT Act). A regression equation attempts to capture the causal relationship by
holding other factors constant to isolate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent
variable. In regression equations, the dependant variable is placed on the left hand side of the
equation and the independent variables or causal variables are placed on the right hand side of the
equation.
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 H4 = Legal reforms which increase judicial discretion will:
a) Decrease sentence length
b) Increase disparity
c) Increase the number of departures
These hypotheses are based on the theory that the amount of
discretion afforded judges is directly related to disparity and number of
departures and inversely related to sentence length. In other words, when
judges have their discretion taken away by Congress in the form of the
Guidelines or subsequent legislation, such as the PROTECT Act,
sentence length will increase while sentencing disparity and number of
departures will decrease. Likewise, when district court judges are
afforded more discretion as they were after Blakely and Booker, sentence
length will decrease while disparity in sentences of similar cases and
departures will increase.
The basic regression model for these hypotheses using sentence
length as a dependent variable is as follows:
SENTENCE LENGTH = β0 + β1PROTECT + β2Blakely + β3Booker
+ β4Depart + β5(vector of year dummies) + β6(vector of circuit
dummies) + ε 122
Where,
SENTENCE LENGTH= the sentence defendants received in months
in prison less the guideline minimum.
PROTECT = The PROTECT Act (0 if district court case occurred
before the Act, 1 if after Act).
Blakely = The decision in Blakely v. Washington (0 if district court
case occurred before court decision, 1 if after).
Booker = The decision of U.S. v. Booker (0 if district court case
occurred before court decision, 1 if after).

122. This regression equation is used to determine the effect of each independent variable on
sentence length when all other independent variables are held constant. Social scientists strive to
include all causal variables in their regression equation. Thus, while the particular year in which a
case was decided may not per se be of interest, it is included in the equation as it may contribute to
variations in the outcome or dependent variable. By including independent variables, such as a
vector of circuit and year dummies, the social scientist controls for factors that may be leading to
changes in the dependent variable—here sentence length—in order to isolate the effect of the legal
change.
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Depart = Departure type (0 if no departures and Guideline sentencing
ranges followed, 1 if departures and sentencing ranges not followed.
Vector of year dummies = representation of the year in which each
case was decided.
Vector of circuit dummies = A representation of the particular circuit
in which each case was decided (1 though 12 correspond to each circuit.
The 9th Circuit is left out of the regression).123
In one regression, I use data which includes cases prior to the
PROTECT Act and before Blakely/Booker to isolate the effect of the
PROTECT Act on sentences. In a second regression, I use all of the data
to analyze the three legal reforms together. Hypotheses relating to
departure rates and disparity are tested by comparing standard deviations
and number of departures graphically during specific time periods.
Further, I compare whether the location of a case within a specific
judicial circuit affects disparity and departure rates.
The direct impact of the PROTECT Act and the Supreme Court
decisions in Blakely and Booker was examined through Hypotheses 3
and 4 above. In the first regression, the effect of the PROTECT Act on
sentence length was isolated by limiting the data to cases prior to the
PROTECT Act and prior to Blakely. The regression results are as
follows:
1. For Drug Amount #1
SENTENCE LENGTH = 1.68 + -1.38 PROTECT + -13.39Departure +
(1.64) (1.02)
(0.45)
β3(years) + β4(circuits) + ε
N = 571. Adj. R2 = 0.63
Significant coefficients in italics; standard errors in parentheses.

123. Dummy variables, such as circuit and year, simply indicate where a case is placed
temporally and spatially (i.e. the case occurred in the Ninth Circuit or not). To use such dummy
variables correctly, a base group must be designated for comparison. The interpretation of
coefficients for each different group of cases (i.e. cases occurring in the Second Circuit) is made in
relationship to the base group (here the Ninth Circuit). For example, if the coefficient for the second
circuit is 1.9, this means that a case occurring in the second circuit will have a sentence of 1.9
months longer than that occurring in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit was chosen as a base group
as this was the largest circuit.

1]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES & JUDICIAL DISCRETION

33

2. For Drug Amount #2
SENTENCE LENGTH = 2.47 + -1.44PROTECT + -15.84Departure +
(2.38) (1.55)
(0.58)
β3(years) + β4(circuits) + ε
N = 315. Adj. R2 = 0.74.
These results (presented in full in Table A1 of the Appendix) show
that the PROTECT Act had no statistically significant effect on sentence
length. Instead, the only statistically significant determinant of sentence
length was the judges’ decision to depart or not, which is embedded in
the original Guideline scheme discussed at the beginning of this paper.
In the second set of regressions, the effect of all three legal changes
is tested using all of the data, but as in the first regression set, the
decision to depart significantly lowers the sentence length. The full
results for the second set of regressions are presented in Table A2 of the
Appendix. For sentence length, the changes in the law had no effect for
either drug type. The results are as follows:
1. For Drug Amount #1
SENTENCE LENGTH = 0.59 + -1.00PROTECT + 0.56Blakely +
(1.99) (1.31)
(1.00)
1.36Booker + -11.27Departure + β5(years) + β6(circuits) + ε
(2.07)
(0.33)
N = 1,112 . Adj. R2 = 0.54 .
Significant coefficients in italics; standard errors in parentheses.
2. For Drug Amount #2
SENTENCE LENGTH = 1.73 + -1.25PROTECT + -0.37Blakely +
(3.24) (2.18)
(1.41)
2.21Booker + -13.61Departure + β5(years) + β6(circuits) + ε
(3.66)
(0.48)
N = 640. Adj. R2 = 0.59
As shown by the two regressions above, whether judges depart from
the Guidelines has the largest impact on sentence length. None of the
legal changes had any statistically significant effect on sentence length.
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While the above results show that the three legal reforms had little or
no effect on sentence length for sentences that either followed the
Guideline structure or a departure scheme, the question remains: What
effect did the legal changes have on disparity and the number of
departures? To determine the effect of the legal changes on disparity, the
standard deviation of case decisions around the average sentence for each
drug type before and after legal reform was analyzed. For this part of the
analysis, which relies on several graphic depictions, the periods of time
analyzed are 1) prior to the PROTECT Act, 2) between the PROTECT
Act and the decision in Blakely, and 3) after the Blakely decision. For
graphical analysis, the date of Blakely in 2004 is used to define groups
because Blakely marked the first instance when the Supreme Court
signaled that district court judges might be afforded more discretion.
Prior to any legal amendments to the Guidelines, the standard
deviation for all cases (Guideline table and departures) was 9.68 for drug
amount #1 and 12.24 for drug amount #2. After Congress reduced the
ability of judges to depart in the PROTECT Act, the average standard
deviation was reduced to 6.73 for drug amount #1 and 8.72 for drug
amount #2. Finally, after Blakely, which signaled a new era of
sentencing, and allowed judges to have greater discretion, the standard
deviation increased to 11.41 for drug amount #1 and 13.82 for drug
amount #2. The disparity of decisions after Blakely exceeded both the
pre-PROTECT Act and post-PROTECT Act period. These results
indicate that the legal amendments, while having little effect on average
national sentence length of Guideline range or departure cases, did affect
disparity of decisions across judicial circuits.

Figure 3. Disparity of sentencing decisions.
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To determine the effect of the legal reforms on departure rates
(Changes in Guideline Scheme, Hypothesis 5), rates of departure for
three periods were explored to isolate the effect of each legal change on
departure rates. As seen in Figure 4, prior to the PROTECT Act, for drug
amount #1 judges departed from the guidelines about 9.56% and for drug
amount #2 12.97% of the time. As intended by the PROTECT Act,
departure rates following this Act were dramatically reduced to 3.26%
for drug amount #1 and 4.62% for drug amount #2. After
Blakely/Booker, departure rates for both drugs increased dramatically,
exceeding those from the pre-PROTECT period. For example, departures
increased to18.85% for drug amount #1 and 20.31% for drug amount #2
after the Blakely decision. The additional discretion afforded by
Blakely/Booker caused judges to depart substantially more.

Figure 4. Departure rates.
The above results show the effect of changes in laws on sentencing
disparity and departure for the entire nation. As previously mentioned,
these overall results mask variation among the districts and circuits. As
seen in Figure 5, sentence length varies among the circuits for each time
period analyzed when data for both drug crimes is pooled together to
allow for a meaningful circuit level comparison. 124 In the period prior to
the PROTECT Act, average sentences varied widely among the circuits.
District courts in the Ninth Circuit on average sentenced defendants to

124. It should be noted that some circuits have more cases than others. It is possible that the
proportion of one type of drug case relative to another type of cases could affect the results.
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less time for the crimes analyzed, while the Third Circuit had the highest
average sentences for this period.

Figure 5. Sentence length by circuit after major changes in the law.
In the second time period, it was expected that sentence length would
increase because judges were supposed to depart less after the
PROTECT Act, which in turn would increase average sentence length.
Congress enacted the PROTECT Act to target judicial districts where it
was believed that judges were departing too much and had average
sentencing lengths that were too low. In other words, Congress seemed
to be specifically targeting most Southwest states as well as a few other
districts that had high departure rates prior to the PROTECT Act as
compared to the rest of the nation. 125 While the majority of circuits were
responsive to the legislators’ intent, judges in the First through Fourth
Circuits defied this trend by sentencing defendants to less time. The
Ninth Circuit did, however, comply as intended and substantially
increased sentence length during this period. Finally, after
Blakely/Booker it was expected that sentence length would substantially
decrease because judges would have more discretion to depart, and it was
assumed that they would use this discretion. While sentence length did
decrease in eight of eleven judicial circuits, it remained about the same in
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and increased only slightly in the Second
Circuit. Further, post-Booker, sentence length was lower than the prePROTECT Act period in only six circuits, suggesting that Booker did not
trump the effect of the PROTECT Act in all circuits.
Disparity and departure rates within circuits also varied considerably
depending on the circuit. Prior to the PROTECT Act the disparity of
125. USSC Report, 2003, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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average sentences varied significantly by circuit with the Ninth Circuit
having the highest rate of disparity (See Figure 6 below). The PROTECT
Act was supposed to limit the ability of judges to depart, and in theory
limit the disparity of decisions. Disparity decreased in five circuits
appreciably after the PROTECT Act. In two of the circuits (First and
Third), there was no appreciable difference in disparity for this time
period. After Blakely/Booker, judges’ expanded discretion was thought to
lead to an increase in disparity as noted in the dissent by Justice Breyer
in Booker. 126 However, as with the analysis of other time periods, not all
the circuits acted the same. Disparity actually decreased in the First,
Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.

Figure 6. Disparity by circuit after major changes in the law.
Finally, departure rates did not increase as dramatically as expected
after Booker. The circuit-level departure rate analysis is similar to the
sentence length and disparity analyses. In short, district courts located in
particular circuits varied widely in the amount they departed during
certain time periods. Some circuits acted as expected, departing less after
the PROTECT Act and more after Booker, while other circuits acted
quite differently.
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
What do the results tell us about the regulation of judicial discretion?
As seen by the sentencing data, the Guideline scheme—in which the
USSC and Congress specify the amount of judicial discretion to be
exercised in specific cases—matters and has a profound effect on case
126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 329 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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outcomes even where the effects are not necessarily those intended by
the legislature. First, cases implicating the Guideline’s table ranges result
in higher sentences. If elected politicians want to limit judicial discretion
in sentencing and appear tough on crime, this goal can be accomplished
by highly specific legislation in which they limit judges’ discretion. As
shown by the results, higher sentences are achieved if judges are
compelled to use the sentencing tables. When case facts and the law
allow for departures, sentences are lower and may subvert the intent of
Congress.
Second, the variance of sentences is highly dependent on whether
judges apply Guideline ranges or not. When judges depart, the variance
of possible outcomes increased three to six times. This suggests that
where judges’ discretion is not constrained and they choose to apply
departures there is greater disparity in case outcomes for similar cases.
Analysis of the variance of case outcomes by group makes it clear that
Congress’ goal of reducing disparity in sentences nationally was
achieved, but only when judges used the sentencing table, not when they
departed from it.
Third, when judges applied Guideline ranges from the sentencing
table, they sentenced the overwhelming majority of these defendants to
the absolute minimum sentence of the sentencing range. Although
sentencing tables allowed judges to choose one sentence out of seventeen
to twenty-one choices, judges nationwide chose the lowest sentence in
the range 73% to 95% of the time. While the sentencing guideline
boundaries constrain judges’ discretion, the lower limit provides a focal
point for judges’ decisions in the majority of cases. This implies that
judges are constrained only by the minimum sentence and not the range
of possible sentences.
Fourth, the dramatic changes in Guideline laws do not seem to affect
sentence length significantly for either the Guideline group or departure
group nationwide, but did affect departure rates and disparity. Despite
what were thought to be the two most dramatic changes in the Federal
Sentencing Guideline system since its inception, the PROTECT Act and
Booker, these changes seem to have had little effect on sentences within
each of the two groups. As a result, sentence length is driven most
significantly by district court judges’ choice to depart and drug amount.
Congress’s attempt to limit departures and the Supreme Court’s decision
to render the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory did not alter
sentence length within the Guideline and departure categories, at least
not immediately. This suggests that the Guideline application is path
dependent. Judges who had been trained in Federal Guidelines when they
were mandatory continued to apply them in the same way, even after
they were transformed into advisory constraints judges. Finally, legal
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regulation of discretion directly affected departure rates. When discretion
is constrained (after the PROTECT Act) departure rates go down, and
when discretion is augmented (after Blakely and Booker) departure rates
increase—at least when national averages are analyzed. Legal regulation
also affected the disparity of sentencing decisions for similar defendants
convicted of similar crimes. When discretion is constrained the disparity
of outcomes decreases; when discretion is augmented case outcomes are
more disparate nationwide.
The circuit-level analysis revealed wide variation in decision making
across circuits in all three time-periods. Although one of the main
reasons for enacting the Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce the
disparity of outcomes based on location, sentence length, departure rates,
and disparity varied by circuit. This variation continued when I
specifically analyze the period after the PROTECT Act and after Booker.
As far as the PROTECT Act, seven out of eleven circuits acted in the
way that the legislature intended—i.e. raised sentences, lowered
departure rates, and lowered disparity of outcomes. However, district
courts in the First through Fourth Circuits were not so responsive. Rather
than increase sentence length in these circuits, sentence length actually
decreased from pre-PROTECT Act sentences. However, if legislators
only intended to target certain district courts such as those located in the
Ninth Circuit, as suggested by some of the legislative history, 127 then
they were highly successful. In the Ninth Circuit the average sentence for
both crimes increased from 67.07 months in prison to 79.65 months in
prison after the PROTECT Act.
Likewise, Booker had mixed effects depending on court location. In
every circuit but three (the Second, Fifth, and Sixth), sentence length
decreased from the post-PROTECT era cases to the post-Booker era
cases. However in four circuits the decrease did not render sentences
lower than the pre-PROTECT period. As a result, Booker did not have
the feared effect of reducing sentences substantially. The circuit-level
analysis of disparity and departure rates shows again that there was great
variation in district court responses to the changes in law. Altering
discretion of lower court judges did not always have the intended effect;
only in some of the circuits was an increase in discretion met with lower
sentences and greater disparity and decrease in discretion met with
higher sentences and less disparity.

127. USSC 2003, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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VII. A CASE FOR ALLOWING SENTENCING DISPARITY TO PERSIST
The results of this study have shown that the Sentencing Guidelines
effectively constrain judges when those judges apply the sentencing table
ranges. In other words, when the legislator limits the sentencing choices
of judges through the use of the sentencing table, judges heed these
limitations. However, the Guideline system provides an imperfect way of
constraining judicial discretion because the system itself allows judges to
depart from the sentencing table ranges in certain instances and these
departures lead to much of the disparity in sentencing.
Although the USSC and many politicians argue that disparity
resulting from judges’ discretionary departure is unwanted and creates
unfairness, there are indeed arguments for allowing district court judges
to use their discretion. Information supporting the arguments in favor of
discretion and disparity comes from the quantitative analysis presented
here as well as from interviews and a nationwide survey which I
conducted in 2007 and 2008. 128

128. In order to understand more effectively what judges think about constraints imposed on
their sentencing discretion, I conducted a nationwide survey of district court judges replicating that
done by the USSC in 1991. U. S. Sentencing Comm’n, N ATIONAL SURVEY OF JUDGES AND COURT
PRACTITIONERS (1991) (ICPSR SURVEY NO. 9837) (Codebook and data deposited with ICPSR in
Ann Arbor, Michigan). I then compared responses in 1991 to 2007/2008. The survey also was
supplemented with responses to questions I posed directly to judges in the Eastern, Central and
Southern judicial districts of California during live interviews. In the USSC’s 1991 survey, 415
active district court judges provided opinions about the Guidelines and their application. Id. In the
2008 survey that I conducted, 125 judges responded including fourteen from districts in California
who agreed to live interviews to complete the survey. The 2008 responses were added to the USSC’s
1991 database to create a data file containing 540 observations for two time periods.
The 2008 survey included twenty-seven questions from the USSC’s 1991 survey on
topics regarding sentencing disparity, plea bargains, guideline departures, and Congressional
restrictions on discretion such as mandatory minimums, consecutive sentences, and the Guidelines
themselves. The majority of questions provided multiple-choice responses with either a range of
choices or simply a yes or no response. All of the questions allowed judges to respond with “don’t
know.” For the questions on disparity, respondents had six choices regarding the prevalence of a
stated event which ranged from “in all or most cases” to “in no cases.” Many of the multiple choice
questions were followed with open ended questions which in the 1991 survey were coded to fit into
categories defined by the USSC. The 1991 responses to open ended questions were unavailable. The
open ended responses to the 2008 survey have been recorded but were not coded using the USSC
rules as this would involve a subjective determination.
In the 2008 survey, I excluded some case specific questions asked to judges in 1991, but
included additional questions on the political party appointing the judge, year of appointment,
location of judges, advantages and disadvantages of the Guideline system, and finally opinions
concerning the effect of the PROTECT Act and U.S. v. Booker. The surveys were confidential and
the majority of judges did not provide their names. After mailing surveys to over 600 district court
judges between October 2007 and February 2008, in March 2008, I sent a one page letter to judges
asking them to respond to the previously mailed survey if they had not already done so. My efforts
resulted in 125 completed surveys. In some instances, judges did not answer all of the survey
questions. In a few instances, there was missing data on one or more of the variables for district
location, year of appointment, or party of appointing president.
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First, disparity should be seen as positive when it allows judges to
exercise their discretion to fashion just sentences. District court judges
are more qualified and have more experience than Congress and higher
court judges when it comes to sentencing individual defendants because
they oversee thousands of Sentencing Guideline plea bargains and
hundreds of trials during their careers on the bench. These are two tasks
that neither Congress nor appellate courts ever undertake. 129
Second, although judges do not like their discretion constrained, it
does not follow that they will abuse their discretion when such
constraints are removed. District court judges surveyed nationwide, and
interviewed in person in California, indicated that they do not like
discretion limiting legislation such as the PROTECT Act and preferred
discretion expanding policies by the Supreme Court in Booker. Indeed,
eighty-two percent of judges surveyed and interviewed indicated that
they preferred sentencing after Booker as compared to during the preBooker period. 130 Although it can generally, and not surprisingly, be said
that judges who have experienced the Guidelines for some time do not
like their discretion constrained, 131 it does not follow that judges would
fail to apply the law as written. Rather, judges apply Guideline ranges
and continue to do so even though the Guidelines are no longer
mandatory constraints in the majority of their cases.132
The third justification for allowing disparity in sentencing is that
there are many variations in local case loads and practices which suggest
that cases in one area of the country should not be treated the same as
cases in the other part of the country. For example, disparity is often due
129. One active district court judge explained that during confirmation hearings, many
Congressmen are very supportive of the appointees, but after the confirmation process they claim
these same judges are “renegades” Interview 7303, November 29, 2007. Several judges also voiced
the concern of one district court judge that Congressmen were “grossly ignorant” of the sentencing
laws and did not have a “rational basis” for reforms, but simply enact them to appease the voting
public (Interview 7401, May 7, 2007; Interview 7402, May 9, 2007; Interview 7303, November 29,
2007). Despite the negative reaction to Congress, judges are compelled to follow the law and do
indeed follow it in the vast majority of cases they hear.
130. LYDIA BRASHEAR TIEDE, THE POLITICS OF CRIMINAL LAW REFORM: A C OMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF LOWER COURT DECISION-MAKING (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, San Diego) (on file with the Department of Political Science).
131. Prior to Booker, judges referred to themselves as “not judges,” but as orangutans or
automatons. Interview with a senior district judge, June 13, 2007; Survey response 101. One district
court judge from the First Circuit stated that he “emphatically” preferred sentencing after Booker
because “Booker restored [him] to the role of judge rather than an automaton mouthing the sentence
the executive pre-determined” District court survey response 101.
132. While judges indicated that Booker had a dramatic effect on their sentencing decisions,
judges still indicated that in the majority of cases, sometimes up to 99%, they still apply the
Guidelines. This was confirmed by both interviews and survey responses conducted in 2007/2008.
Judges did, however, indicate that besides giving them more discretion, Booker makes sentencing
defendants take considerably more time as judges now list all the factors they consider for
sentencing and often make a written record of all the factors that contributed to the sentence, as
shown me by one district judge in Santa Ana California (Interview 7307, October 11, 2007).
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to pre-sentencing differences in prosecutors’ charging and pleading
practices; 133 the availability of certain types of defense attorneys; 134
caseloads;135 and local case-processing practices.136 Still others believe
disparity is primarily due to gender, race, and ethnicity.137 Finally,
disparity often corresponds to the specific regions where district court
judges are located. 138 Because pre-sentencing procedures are so diverse
and pervasive, judges should be able to alter their sentencing practices to
respond in kind.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines that limit
district court judges’ discretion on outcomes of cases has been tested
using a unique method to control for variations in case facts. Whether
judges apply sentencing table ranges or depart from them dramatically
affects sentencing outcomes and disparity of sentencing results. Legal
changes of the Guideline scheme had little effect on sentence length
within groups when departures were controlled for. In other words, cases
where sentences are based on the Guideline ranges have varied little
despite the legal changes to the Guideline scheme. Likewise, cases which
did not employ Guideline ranges also varied little. However, sentence
length was affected by legal changes when cases were analyzed at the
circuit level. The results also suggest that Congress may have enacted
laws changing the Guideline system to rein in some recalcitrant agents,
such as the district courts in the Ninth Circuit, without giving much
thought to their effect on other districts.
The legal changes also affected rates of departure nationwide and by
circuits. When judges’ discretion was limited, as after the PROTECT
Act, judges’ rates of departure as a whole decreased. When judges’
discretion was expanded after Booker, departure rates increased. Further,
133. USSC Report, G (2004) supra, note 103; Stephano Bibas, Federalism: Regulating Local
Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 137, 142–44 (2005).
134. Douglas Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity
from Differences in Defense Counsel under Guideline Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435 (2002).
135. William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices, and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’ G REP. 309 (1993).
136. J. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. District
Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255 (2005).
137. M. Free, The Impact of Federal Sentencing Reforms on African Americans, 28 J. BLACK
STUDIES 268 (1997); David Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001); L. Pasko, Villain or Victim:
Regional Variation and Ethnic Disparity in Federal Drug Offense Sentencing, 13 CRIM. J. POL.
REV. 307 (2002).
138. U. S. Sentencing Comm’n (2008), supra note 115 (showing the sentences for criminal
categories by circuit and state). By analyzing these tables as well as those for other years, it is clear
that the sentence length and departure rates for particular crimes vary by region.
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the legal changes affected the rates of disparity in sentencing as
measured by the standard deviation. When judges are given more
discretion, similarly situated criminal defendants are treated more
disparately. However, this result also depends on where the district
courts are located. When both drug types are pooled, district courts
located in various circuits vary in how they react and comply with
Supreme Court decisions and legislation. Such results indicate that the
lower courts’ responsiveness to higher court precedent and legislation
varies by court location and, while the intent of the legislature may be
achieved for some circuits, other district courts fail to comply with the
legislative intent. The lack of a pattern in compliance and noncompliance suggests the need for new theories regarding lower court
decision making via other political actors.
This analysis shows that written laws that constrain judicial
discretion can work and that judges follow the constraints delineated in
the four corners of the statute. However, where there is room for judges
to exercise their own discretion they will do so, allowing departures in
cases where they believe they are warranted. Finally, this study has
shown that if Congress really wants to constrain judges, it can by
specifically stating so in the law. The real question is, after Booker, does
Congress want to revert back to a system of limiting discretion?

44

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 24

Appendix
Table A1 Multiple Regression Analysis of Sentence on PROTECT Act
Independent
SENTENCE LENGTH
Variables
Drug Amount #1
Drug Amount #2
PROTECT Act
-1.38
-1.44
(1.02)
(1.55)
Departure
-13.39**
-15.84**
(0.45)
(0.58)
Year 1999
1.85
-2.66
(1.64)
(2.38)
Year 2000
2.25
-4.00
(1.65)
(2.35)
Year 2001
1.67
-4.03
(1.67)
(2.42)
Year 2002
0.59
-0.46
(1.61)
(2.32)
Year 2003
1.39
-1.16
(1.74)
(2.59)
Year 2004
2.55
-0.02
(1.92)
(2.77)
Year 2005
Year 2006

-

-

Circuit1

-0.76
(1.54)
-2.98*
(1.23)
-0.83
(2.01)
-1.35
(1.17)
-1.39
(0.98)
-0.02
(1.33)
-1.15
(1.26)
-0.78
(1.08)
-1.56
(1.36)

0.54
(2.16)
-0.96
(1.83)
2.36
(1.72)
1.39
(1.37)
1.28
(1.14)
2.77
(1.82)
1.13
(1.56)
0.43
(1.33)
-0.12
(1.52)

Circuit2
Circuit3
Circuit4
Circuit5
Circuit6
Circuit7
Circuit8
Circuit10

1]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES & JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Circuit11

-2.45*
(1.07)
1.67
(1.64)

0.67
(1.29)
2.47
(2.38)

N

571

315

Adjusted R2

0.63

0.74

Intercept

Note: Coefficients are un-standardized ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression values; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients in
italics are significant at p<.10, *p< 0.05 and ** p<0.00.
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Table A2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Sentence on all legal changes
Independent
SENTENCE LENGTH
Variables
Drug Amount #1
Drug Amount #2
PROTECT Act
-1.00
-1.25
(1.31)
(2.18)
Blakely
0.56
-0.37
(1.00)
(1.41)
Booker
1.36
2.21
(2.07)
(3.66)
Departure
-11.27**
-13.61**
(0.33)
(0.48)
Year 1999
1.82
-1.69
(2.08)
(3.38)
Year 2000
2.24
-3.60
(2.09)
(3.33)
Year 2001
1.32
-3.46
(2.11)
(3.44)
Year 2002
0.45
0.03
(2.05)
(3.30)
Year 2003
1.47
-0.51
(2.21)
(3.66)
Year 2004
2.38
0.73
(2.45)
(3.92)
Year 2005
0.92
-0.01
(3.24)
(5.40)
Year 2006
0.92
-0.61
(3.32)
(5.50)
Circuit1
0.42
1.09
(1.55)
(2.77)
Circuit2
-1.77
0.32
(1.04)
(1.63)
Circuit3
2.36
0.27
(1.71)
(2.99)
Circuit4
0.09
1.74
(0.92)
(1.41)
Circuit5
-0.46
0.73
(0.76)
(1.07)
Circuit6
0.72
2.11
(1.13)
(1.66)
Circuit7
-1.59
0.68
(1.09)
(1.66)
Circuit8
-1.60
-1.26
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(0.85)
-0.10
(1.08)
-0.93
(0.86)
0.59
(1.99)

(1.18)
0.40
(1.55)
-0.15
(1.34)
1.73
(0.53)

N

1,112

640

Adjusted R2

0.54

0.59

Circuit 10
Circuit11
Intercept

Note: Coefficients are un-standardized ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression values; standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients in
italics are significant at p<0.01
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